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trusts, a trust that has been
number several
of revoked
and
J
amended
times,wills
substantial gifls to charity, the last trust amendment handwritten ol the back of a Medicare check stub and beginning with the
phrase "If anything happens to me on the
trip to La Jolla ...
".Does this take you back
to law school and to those twisted fact
patterns that only a law professor could
dream up? Well dream became reality in
the case of Esale ?f Kik I decided last
year by the Idaho Supreme Court. The
case involved very unusual facts and presented several important issues to the Supreme Court including the applicability of
Idaho's former mortmain statute to an
inter vivos trust, the admissibility of extrinsic evidence to interpret a trust, and
the applicability of Idaho's statute dealing
with the suspension of the power of alienation to charitable trusts.
Muriel Kirk was an unusual woman.
Described variously in the court records as
a "Renaissance woman" and as like
"Auntie Maine", she was a lawyer who
practiced law for a time in Oklahoma, a
real estate agent, a pilot, an art collector,
and a world traveler. In December 1989,
she executed an inter vivos trust and pourover will naming herself as trustee and life
beneficiary of the revocable trust, and
naming West One Bank as the successor
trustee and personal representativc of her
estate. Her daughter, Diana, was named

A

Mulnei Kirk ana coinl]2(lpon Mr. cnirisloptier.

as the primary remainder beneficiary of the
trust along with the Assistance League of
Boise and the Milton Academy where Diana
had gone to school. The trust was registered
in Ada County and was funded. The trust
instrument provided that it could be
amended as follows:
The Grantor may at any time during her lifetime amend the provisions of the MURIEL H. KIRK
FAMILY TRUST by an instrument signed by the Grantor
and
2
delivered to the Trustee,

Six months later, in June 1990, as a
result of Diana's untimely death, Mrs.
Kirk amended the trust for the first time
eliminating the gifts to Diana and leaving
the Assistance League and the Milton Academy as the only beneficiaries of the trust.
In October 1990, Mrs. Kirk amended
the trust a second time eliminating the
Milton Academy. In the amendment, she
explained that Diana had been introduced
to smoking while at school at the Academy
which had eventually "ruined her life." In
addition to eliminating the Milton Academy from the trust, this second amendment to the trust contained the following
provision:
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Afler the death of the Grantor, the
Trustee shall hold, manage and
control the property comprising the
Trust estate for beneficiaries to be
named in an attached sheet, which3
will be added to from time to time.

later. An heir search conducted by West
One Bank, the personal representative of
her estate, located Fred Salfeety, her
nephew. Salfeety barely knew Muriel
Kirk. He testified at trial that he met her
for the first time at his mother's funeral.
His parents had been divorced and he had
Both the first and second amendments to been raised by his father's family, and, as
the trust were typed, formally executed by a result, knew little ofhis mother's family.
Muriel Kirk and delivered to West One He stated that he hadn't seen Muriel Kirk
for twenty to thirty years.
Bank, the successor Trustee.
Aside from the eccentric facts, the
The same day that Muriel Kirk exKirk case is notable for several reasons.
ecutcd the second amendment to the trust
For the first time in a reported opinion
she also drafted a list of dispositions of
since 1945, the Idaho Supreme Court adpersonal property to several people which dressed the interpretation of Idaho's
was typed, signed, attached to the second mortmain statute. The Court
also adamendment as provided by its express lan- dressed for the first time whether Idaho's
guage and which she delivered to West One perpetuities substitute applies to chariBank.
table gifts. Finally, and possibly most
As a result of the second amendment to importantly, the Court decided several
her trust, Mrs. Kirk arguably left a gap in questions regarding the admissibility of
the disposition of her property. Although extrinsic evidence to interpret a trust prothe typed list attached to the second amend- vision.
ment contained provisions disposing of
certain personal property and the trust instrument disposed of certain leases to the
Assistance League, tile trust did not contain
For the first time in a
provisions disposing of the rest of Mrs.
reported opinion since
Kirk's real estate. Mrs. Kirk was aware of
this potential problem and she was re- 1945, the Idaho Supreme
minded of it on several occasions by Wcs
Court addressed the
Seideman, the officer of West One Bank
with whom she had been dealing.
interpretation of Idaho's
In May 1990, Mrs. Kirk planned to
mortmain statute.
drive to La Jolla, California. Apparently in
anticipation of this trip and aware of the
potential gap in her estate plan, she drafted
a handwritten list of property dispositions Mortmain
on the back of a Medicare check stub and
stapled this document to the second amendBecause the handwritten dispositions
nent to her trust. This handwritten instru- on the back of the check stub to the Law
ment began with the phrase "If anything School and to the Botanical Gardens were
happens to me on the trip to La Jolla ..." written
within 120 days of Muriel Kirk's
and, after listing several dispositions or death, the question was raised whether
items of personal property contained the this disposition violated the mortmain
following provision:
statute. 5 At the magistrate level, Judge
Patricia Flanagan originally ruled the disDonna and Joyce will take plenty
positions did not violate the mortmain
of time to sell other property at
statute because that statute only applcd to
proper prices [no rushed sale
dispositions by will or by a testamentary
Brooks!] then 1/3 goes to law chair
trust. The handwritten dispositions inthe
for Donna's Allen - 2/3 to BotaniKirk case were amendments to an inter
cal Garden for English garden
vivos trust, and conse uently were not
4
dedicated to Muriel and Diana.
governed by the statute.'
On appeal to the District Court, Judge
Mrs. Kirk reumcd safely from the trip Newhouse affirmed the ruling of Judge
to La Jolla but died unexpectedly two months Flanagan on the mortmain statute on dif-
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ferent grounds. Judge Newhouse reasoned
that because the inter vivos trust was, for all
intents and purposes, the same as a disposition by will or by testamentary trust, the
mortmain statute applied, He held, however, that the mortmain statute violated
equal protection principles and was, therefore, unconstitutional.
The Supreme Court adopted Judge
Flanagan's narrow reading of the statute
holding that, by the its express language,
the statute only applied to wills and testamentary trusts. T he Supreme Court decl ined8 to address the constitutionality question.
Despite the fact that Idaho repealed
the mortmain statute in question in Kirk in
1994, the Court's narrow reading ofit and
the questionable constitutional status of
the statute has significance for Idaho's
statute restricting devises to nursing homes
and residential home operators. That provision, Idaho Code § 15-2-616, was added
to the code in 1989 and is in some ways a
specialized mortmain statute for nursing
homes and their operators. The nursing
home statute imposes a rebuttable presumption that any "devise or bequest" to an
owner, operator, or employee of a nursing
home within one year of the testator's
death is the result of undue influence.
Like the mortmain statute at issue in
Kirk, the nursing home provision is limited in its applicability to "devises and
bequests". A strong argument could be
made that the same narrow interpretation
of this statutory language should apply to
the nursing home statute. And, like
mortrmain statutes generally, the nursing
home provision amounts to a restriction on
the testator's power of disposition even
under circumstances where undue influence could not actually be proved. The
only difference between the nursing home
provision and a traditional mortmain statute is that the nursing home provision
imposes only arebuttable presumption that
covered dispositions are invalid, whereas
most mortmain statutes conclusively declare covered dispositions invalid. Whether
this distinction is enough to save the nursing home provision is open to debate.
Suspension of the Power of Alienation
The trust instruments in the Kirk case
provided that certain oil leases owned by
Muriel Kirk should not be sold but should

be maintained to provide income to the
charitable beneficiaries. Salfeety argued
that this violated Idaho's perpetuitics substitute statute. That statute provides that
the "absolute power of alienation of real
property" cannot be suspended fora period
of longer than "the continuance ofthe lives
of the persons in being at the creation of the
limitation or condition, and 25 years thereafter." Because the trust expressly provided for holding the oil leases in perpetuity, the question was whether this violated
the statute.
Section 55-111 of the Idaho Code
expressly provides that "there shall be no
rule against perpetuities" and has traditionally been viewed as a substitute for the
rule against perpetuities in this state. The
code provision is narrower than the traditional rule, primarily in the fact that it does
not require vesting within the specified
period, it does not apply to personal property and that it expressly provides that
instruments shall be construed to avoid
violating the statute. Despite the apparent
intent on the part of the Idaho Legislature
to repeal the rule against perpetuities in

Idaho, the Idaho courts have looked at how
other states have approached the rule
against perpetuities in interpreting the
Idaho statute. In Kirk, the court did just
that in concluding that the statute did not
apply to charitable trusts.
Applying the Idaho statute to charitable trusts would have seriously limited
the usefulness of those instruments. The
purpose behind the traditional rule against
perpetuities was to limit the unproductive
dead hand control of private property that
would take that property out of productive
use and apply it for potentially arcane
purposes. Most charitable gifts are not
made to a particular individual but are
rather to all entity and the goal of the donor
is that property should be maintained for
the benefit of the charity for a significant
period of time. Dead hand control of
private wealth is not as much of an issue
where the testator has already alienated
property outside his or her family and
applied it to quasi-public charitable purposes. Moreover, charitable trusts, unlike
private trusts, are modifiable under the
doctrine of cy pres. For these reasons,

charitable trusts have often been treated as
outside the traditional rule against perpetuities.
The decision of the Idaho Supreme
Court in Kirk is consistent with the result
in traditional perpetuities cases and with
the purpose of the Idaho statute. To the
extent that the Idaho rule regarding the
suspension of the power of alienation is
different than the traditional rule against
perpetuities, it was intended to make the
rule against perpetuities less broad in Idaho
than it had traditionally been. It would be
outside the spirit ofthe Idaho rule to interpret it to place greater restrictions on the
power of disposition than Would the traditional rule against perpetuilies.
Admission of Extrinsic Evidence
Tile opinion in Kirk is also interesting
for its holding on the admission of extrinsic evidence. This is an area ofprobate law
that is in some flux. The traditional approach to the admission of extrinsic evidence inthe interpretation of a will or trust
is the "plain meaning rule." Under this
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rule, courts have refused to admit extrinsic
evidence that adds to or contradicts the
testator's will. Extrinsic evidence will not
come in to explain a patent ambiguity one that appears on the face of the document, but will be admissible to cure a latent
ambiguity - one that does not appear on
the face of the will, but instead appears
when the will is applied to the testator's
property or beneficiaries. The Court in
Kirk applied this traditional rule and expressly held that the ambiguity involved in
the interpretation of Muriel Kirk's documents was a latent ambiguity and that
extrinsic evidence was therefore admissible to resolve the ambiguity.
The latent/patent distinction for the
adtnissibilily of extrinsic evidence isproblenatic, at best. The Kirk case illustrates
the problem. Arguably the ambiguity in
Kirk was patent. One did not have to apply
the will to Kirk's property and beneficiaries to see that she had not specified what
should happen to her property if she returned from La Jolla, or to know that she
altered and changed beneficiaries in a potential ly incomplete and contradictory way.
Rather than continuing to struggle
with this confusing and oflen unhelpful
distinction between latent and patent ambiguities, some jurisdictions have adopted
an alternative approach to the admission of
extrinsic evidence. Focusing on the goal of
discovering the testator or settlor's intent,
these courts have reasoned that extrinsic
evidence of the circumstances surrounding the execution of the will should be
considered by the court, and evidence that
tends to establish a reasonable interpretation of the will should be admitted regardless of whether the ambiguity is latent or
patent. 9 This rule would not have resulted
ina different outcome in the Kirk case, but
would have helped resolve future extrinsic
evidence cases and would tip the balance
toward the admission ofextrinsic evidence
to interpret wills and trusts.

Conclusion
Even with a number of years of practice making up law school exams, I don't
know that I have ever come up with an
exam as interesting as the real facts of
Kirk. One thing I am constantly struck by
in the area of trusts and estates is that no
fact pattern can be considered too unusual.
24
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Come to think of it, I might use the facts of
Kirk for the next exam I write for my Wills
and Trusts class!
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